Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Suppose a population of agents faces the *collective action* (Olson [@CR14]) challenge to provide public goods by means of simultaneous, separate *voluntary contributions games* (Isaac et al. [@CR9]). In each one, the collective would benefit from high contributions but individuals may have strategic incentives (Nash [@CR11]) to contribute less. Such situations, also known as 'social dilemmas', are related to collective management of 'common-pool resources' (Ostrom [@CR15]; Schlager and Ostrom [@CR18]) and often result in underprovisioning of the public good (i.e. tragedy of the commons as in Hardin [@CR6]) because of the misalignment of collective interests and strategic incentives.

Generally, grave underprovision of the public good is the unique Nash equilibrium when individual contribution decisions are independent of the matching process. Andreoni ([@CR1])'s model of a linear public goods game with random re-matching of groups is the best-known experimental instantiation of this, and numerous studies have reported corresponding decays in contributions when such games are played in the laboratory (Ledyard [@CR10]; Chaudhuri [@CR2]). Predictions may change dramatically, however, when agents are matched 'assortatively' instead, that is, based on their pre-committed choice on how much to contribute so that high (low) contributors are matched with other high (low) contributors. Such mechanisms have been coined 'meritocratic group-based matching' (Gunnthorsdottir et al. [@CR4]), short 'meritocratic matching' (Nax et al. [@CR12]).[1](#Fn1){ref-type="fn"} Under meritocratic matching, new equilibria emerge through assortative matching that are as good as near-efficient (Gunnthorsdottir et al. [@CR4]; Nax et al. [@CR12]). Indeed, when better (i.e. more efficient) equilibria exist, humans have been shown to consistently play them in controlled laboratory environments (Gunnthorsdottir et al. [@CR4], [@CR5]; Nax et al. [@CR13]; Rabanal and Rabanal [@CR17]).

In this paper, we address the important question of how robust the positive predictions stemming from assortative matching are. To assess this, we generalize the baseline model on two dimensions. On the one hand, we consider a range of public-goods provision efficacies that nests the standard marginal-per-capita-rate-of-return ('mpcr') model as a special, linear case. On the other hand, we allow heterogeneity in players' budgets, expressing the *ex ante* inequality amongst individuals. In other contexts, heterogeneity has been shown to 'help' cooperation (Perc [@CR16]). Our work, in particular, builds on one prior attempt at generalizing the standard model in terms of heterogeneity by Gunnthorsdottir et al. ([@CR5]), who consider two levels of budgets in the standard case of mpcr-linear payoffs.

Methodologically, we blend analytical and computational approaches. Our results summarize as follows. We show analytically that the consequences of permitting heterogeneity in terms of provision of the public good depend crucially on the exact nature of the underlying public-good provision efficacy, but generally are devastating. Indeed, all near-efficient Nash equilibria that exist under homogeneity fall apart when heterogeneity is allowed. Instead, we are either back at the negative all-contribute-nothing equilibrium or new, previously impossible, complex mixed-strategy Nash equilibria emerge. In the latter case, the expected level of resulting public-good provision depends crucially on (i) the public-good provision efficacy and (ii) the population inequality. These mixed equilibria are virtually impossible to characterize and to evaluate analytically for general cases. We therefore use computational methods and quantify the loss resulting from heterogeneity vis-a-vis the homogeneous case as a function of parameters regarding (i) and (ii). Thus, our analysis provides novel insights regarding the possible consequences in terms of making wrong predictions when assuming a homogeneous population, which in many real-world cases may be unrealistic.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Next, we set up the model including details about our computational algorithm. Section [3](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"} contains the paper's results. Section [4](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"} concludes. An "Appendix" contains details of the analytical results.

The Model {#Sec2}
=========
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Simulation {#Sec3}
----------

We simulate the above model in the following way: **1.Initialization:**We assign the initial endowments to each player sampling them from a truncated Gaussian distribution with mean $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\alpha _i $$\end{document}$ of each player is set to 0, hence the simulation starts in the fully defective state.[3](#Fn3){ref-type="fn"}**3.Dynamics of play:**Each player updates his strategy in the following way: With probability *p* he keeps playing the strategy played the round before.[4](#Fn4){ref-type="fn"}With probability $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$1-p$$\end{document}$ he myopically best responds to the strategies played by the other agents the round before:The agent checks what would his rank and consequent payoff be for each of the possible strategies[5](#Fn5){ref-type="fn"} he can play, given that the other agents keep playing the strategies played the round before. He then chooses the strategy that results in the highest payoff. **4.Group matching:**Based on the contribution of each player, groups are formed as described above and payoffs are then materialized.**5.Update and repeat:**The endowment of each player is then reset to his initial one and the algorithm repeats from step *3*. After *T* rounds the algorithm stops and the population average of the strategies is computed. The procedure is repeated *EN* times and the ensemble average of the population average is obtained.

Results {#Sec4}
=======

The above game exhibits different Nash equilibria depending on the value of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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As already shown in Gunnthorsdottir et al. ([@CR4]), in the case of linear payoff ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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A key property of the game, necessary for the nearly efficient equilibria to exist, is that ties in the ranking placement are broken at random. In all these equilibria, in fact, there exists a mixed group where fully contributive players are grouped with defectors, i.e. players contributing the within group Nash Equilibrium. In order for this to be a NE, the fully contributive players must have a sufficiently high probability to be grouped only with other full contributors so that they would not benefit (in expectation) by decreasing their contribution and be placed with certainty in the defectors group.

If each player is endowed with a different initial wealth, however, things change drastically. The heterogeneity of the players implies that there cannot be an equilibrium where more than one player contributes the same positive percentage of his endowment: Since players are ranked based on their effective contributions $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Furthermore, for sublinear payoffs ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To obtain the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game we resort to computational methods. We simulate agents playing the game for different payoffs and different width of the initial wealth distribution.

We are mainly interested in a comparison between the (unique) equilibria in the case of heterogeneous players and the equilibria reached in the homogeneous case. In particular, we are interested in how much efficiency (see footnote 2) is lost due to the heterogeneity of players. Indeed, even though non contribution by all is a Nash Equilibrium, the quasi Pareto optimal equilibrium is payoff dominant[8](#Fn8){ref-type="fn"} and hence is the one to which we refer (when it exists). Furthermore, experimental results (Gunnthorsdottir et al. [@CR4]) have also shown that the nearly efficient equilibria are the one reached by the population.
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                \begin{document}$$0\%$$\end{document}$ loss (dashed green line) means that the system reaches the same efficiency as it would with homogeneous players. A negative loss indicates that when endowments are heterogeneous the equilibrium reaches a higher efficiency than in the homogeneous case.Fig. 1Here we show the loss of efficiency in case of heterogeneous players with respect to the level of contribution that would have been achieved in the homogeneous case. A $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$0\%$$\end{document}$ loss (dashed green line) means that the system reaches the same efficiency that it would have reached in the case of homogeneous players. A negative loss (striped orange area below the green line) indicates that when endowments are heterogeneous the equilibrium reaches a higher efficiency than in the homogeneous case. As predicted, for superlinear payoffs $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We observe, as predicted, that for superlinear payoffs the only possible equilibrium is non contribution by all and thus that the loss of efficiency is total. For intermediate sublinear payoff the system achieves different efficiency level, from quite low ones to levels closer to the homogeneous case. The quantitative value of efficiency that the mixed equilibrium achieves depends on the value of the mpcr and the width of the distribution of initial wealth as well as from other parameters. For values of the exponent of the public good provision lower than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\gamma \rightarrow 0$$\end{document}$, the heterogeneous system approaches the same efficiency of the homogeneous, on account of the benefits of cooperation being obtainable for an arbitrary small contribution.

Interestingly, one can observe that the efficiency loss doesn't seem to change much for different widths of the endowment distribution (see online material).

For the width of the distribution equal to 0 we observe, as expected, the Nash Equilibria in case of homogeneous endowments.[9](#Fn9){ref-type="fn"}

For different values of the marginal per capita rate of return we observe from the simulations (see online material for examples) that the higher the mpcr, the wider is the area with partial efficiency losses in the picture and the smaller is the gain in efficiency around $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Hence we can conclude that for a wide range of payoffs, the more realistic assumption of heterogeneous players leads to a disruptive loss in efficiency when compared to the homogeneous case. For a very limited range of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\gamma $$\end{document}$, however, heterogeneity seems to result in a small increase in efficiency.

Summary of Results {#Sec5}
==================

In summary, mechanisms based on assortative matching promise large efficiency gains when the interaction is such that it is safe to assume that the population consists only of equals. In the presence of heterogeneity, however, whether and how much assortative matching is likely to gain the population (relative to random matching) depends crucially on the provision efficacy of the public good and on the precise degree of heterogeneity. This implies that guarantees of more equal playing fields in these environments may be as important as implementation of assortative matching.

Electronic supplementary material {#Sec9}
---------------------------------

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material. Supplementary material 1 (pdf 232 KB) Supplementary material 2 (pdf 231 KB) Supplementary material 3 (pdf 118 KB)

Appendix: Nash Equilibria {#Sec6}
=========================

In this section we derive the Nash Equilibria of the generalized assortative matching voluntary contribution game.

We first define the game and derive some useful properties of it. Later, we show which equilibria exist for homogeneous and heterogeneous players for different values of the public good game efficacy.

*Notation* The expected payoff of player *i* is $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$w_i \ne w_j \;\; \forall i\ne j$$\end{document}$.Let us first compute the within group best response.

Lemma 1 {#FPar1}
-------
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Proof {#FPar2}
-----
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The payoff for the corner strategies instead is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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NE for Homogeneous Players {#Sec7}
--------------------------

Here we compute what are the Nash Equilibria in the case of homogeneous players. The proof presented here follows closely the one in Gunnthorsdottir et al. ([@CR4]), changing only to adapt it to the generalized payoff. Note that for homogeneous players we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We first of all note that, for homogeneous players, all players playing the within group Nash Equilibria is a best response.

### Lemma 2 {#FPar3}
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### Proof {#FPar4}

This is obviously an equilibrium. Since the mpcr *Q* is smaller than 1, there is no profitable deviation in being the only one contributing more than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In order to prove the existence of the high contribution equilibrium, we first observe that in order for the equilibrium to exist, the following conditions have to hold:

### Lemma 3 {#FPar5}
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### Proof {#FPar6}

If the number of the highest contributors were a multiple of the group size, one of those player could unilaterally deviate and reduce his contribution by an amount small enough to remain in the same group and still profit from the deviation. For the same reason, that number of players has to be bigger than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Lemma 4 {#FPar7}
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### Lemma 5 {#FPar9}
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If there are ties, *j* could increase his contribution by an arbitrary small amount and be sure to be grouped together with players belonging to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Lemma 6 {#FPar11}
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From Lemmata [3](#FPar5){ref-type="sec"}--[6](#FPar11){ref-type="sec"} follows that if an equilibrium s.t. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _i > {\bar{\alpha }}$$\end{document}$ for some *i* exists, then each player plays either $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${\bar{\alpha }}$$\end{document}$ or 1. Furthermore, the number of players playing the within group best response is smaller than the group size.

From the lemmata above we can derive under which condition the generalized voluntary contribution game has a Nash Equilibrium with high contributions level. Hence the existence of a highly efficient equilibrium depends on the marginal per capita rate of return, the number of players and the size of the groups.

### Theorem 1 {#FPar13}
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### Proof {#FPar14}
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For the above to be a NE we have to have that ([7](#Equ7){ref-type=""}) \> ([8](#Equ8){ref-type=""}) and ([9](#Equ9){ref-type=""}) \> ([10](#Equ10){ref-type=""}).
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Hence we obtain the existence of a nearly-efficient high equilibrium depends on the marginal per capita rate of return, the number of players and the size of the groups.

NE for Heterogeneous Players {#Sec8}
----------------------------

Here we show that the near efficient Nash Equilibrium cannot exist for heterogeneous players. Furthermore, we derive under which condition the generalized voluntary contribution game has a pure strategy NE.

In the following we prove the lemmata necessary to derive the equilibrium.

### Lemma 7 {#FPar15}

In case of full heterogeneity[11](#Fn11){ref-type="fn"} the assumptions of Lemma [3](#FPar5){ref-type="sec"} cannot be satisfied.

### Proof {#FPar16}
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### Lemma 8 {#FPar17}

In case of full heterogeneity of endowments $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$w_i$$\end{document}$, with all $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$w_i$$\end{document}$ having the same order of magnitude, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _i = {\bar{\alpha }} \; \forall i$$\end{document}$ is not a Nash Equilibrium.

### Proof {#FPar18}
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From the above lemmas we can derive the following theorem:

### Theorem 2 {#FPar19}

In case of full heterogeneity of endowments $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar20}

From Lemma [7](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"} we know that the nearly efficient NE cannot exist for heterogeneous players. Furthermore, we can prove as in Lemma [5](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"} that there can be no pure strategies such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${\bar{\alpha }}< \alpha _i < 1$$\end{document}$ for any player *i*.

From Lemma [1](#FPar1){ref-type="sec"} we know that for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\gamma \ge 1$$\end{document}$ the within group best response is to play $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _i = 0 \; \forall i$$\end{document}$. This can be an equilibrium and hence for values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\gamma $$\end{document}$ bigger than 1 there is a unique pure strategy NE for the generalized voluntary contribution game.

For $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\gamma < 1$$\end{document}$, however, the within group best response is to play $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _i = {\bar{\alpha }}$$\end{document}$. But Lemma [8](#FPar17){ref-type="sec"} shows that this cannot be an equilibrium of the game (if the values of the endowment don't differ too much). Hence for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\gamma < 1$$\end{document}$ there are no pure strategy NE and thus there has to exist a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\square $$\end{document}$

Note that this kind of mechanism differs crucially from other contribution-inducing mechanisms such as 'punishment' (Fehr and Gächter [@CR3]; Perc [@CR16]) as no payoff additions, subtractions or transfer between individuals take place.

**Definition:**Efficiency is defined as the gain from the game relative to the initial endowment:$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Different initial starting conditions have been explored and they have been observed to have no effect on the final outcome of the simulation.

Inertia was added to ensure the convergence to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (if existing). Without inertia, the best-response dynamics could oscillate around such an equilibrium.

The interval $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\left[ 0,1 \right] $$\end{document}$ is discretized for computational purposes.
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Here we use payoff dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten ([@CR8]), Harsanyi ([@CR7]). The nearly efficient equilibrium can be shown to be ex-ante payoff dominant (Gunnthorsdottir et al. [@CR4]).

Note that there is no continuous convergence from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous case. This is a direct consequence of the fact that, as discussed before, as soon as heterogeneous endowments are introduced, there cannot be an equilibrium where more than one player contributes the same positive percentage of his endowment. This makes the existence of a mixed group impossible. See Lemma [7](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"} in the "Appendix".
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Actually it is already valid for "enough" heterogeneity.
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With the endowments ranked from the highest to the lowest.
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